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The Elusive Origins of Consciousness: 
A Philosophical Argument for Panpsychism over Competing Metaphysical 
Theories of Mind 
 
Tommy Tobias Aahlberg 
 
Introduction 
Underpinning everything that constitutes our perceived reality is consciousness. The fact 
that there is something that it is like to be us is at the foundation of everything we consequently 
come to care about in our lives. Every observation, sensation, thought, and emotion is predicated 
on the phenomenon that there is something that it is like to observe, sense, think, and feel. The 
awareness and experience of a world is the essential factor that separates our universe from any 
conceivable zombie universe where nothing is observed, sensed, thought, or felt. Necessarily, we 
filter every single moment through our consciousness. If consciousness did not exist there would 
be no groundwork for meaning as it would hold no basis in any conceivable creature’s 
awareness, and therefore such a universe would be meaningless.  
 Despite, or perhaps due to, its fundamental nature and important implications – 
consciousness is poorly understood by contemporary science and philosophy alike, at least in the 
theoretical sense of understanding. Phenomenologically, we all have direct access to the contents 
of consciousness. Even though one may not effortlessly explain what it is like to see red or feel 
pain, we certainly know from first person experience what it is like due to our conscious 
awareness of these sensations. Because of consciousness’ remarkable qualities that seem so 
distinct from the world of the physical stuff – matter and energy – around us, it is difficult to 
conceptualize how consciousness came to be, and what it consists of. There are quite a few 
philosophical, and more recently scientific, views on the topic of consciousness. In this paper I 
will examine a few of the most prominent of them. Notably, the views I will consider in this 
paper are mostly dealing with metaphysics, the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the 
nature of reality. However, there will also be an epistemological (concerned with knowledge) 
aspect present throughout my discussion. My central aim in this paper is to unravel panpsychism, 
specifically the type that postulates that physical stuff is intrinsically experiential, as the most 
probable and parsimonious metaphysical view of consciousness. I will do this by first examining 
Cartesian dualism and traditional physicalism, the two most pervasive metaphysical positions, as 
well as discuss a few problems with these views. I will then argue that panpsychism is more 
plausible than these alternatives because it provides adequate solutions to their largest issues 
while maintaining their respective virtues. I will conclude by considering some objections.  
Cartesian Dualism: The Supernatural View 
 Prima facie, the most probable metaphysical position as it relates to consciousness might 
be that of Cartesian dualism. 400 years ago the French philosopher René Descartes, in his work 
Meditations on First Philosophy, deduced that the one thing that he could not doubt in this world 
was that he existed as a thinking thing (1641/2016, p. 76). Even if his thoughts were delusional, 
or fabricated by an all-powerful entity, his mind still existed to have these thoughts (Descartes 
1641/2016, p. 70-76). We can expand his notion here to encompass the entire range of conscious 
experience. Regardless of whether we are fooled by sensory illusions or hallucinations, we are 
still consciously experiencing these sensations. Even a skeptic doubting consciousness would 
need consciousness in order to doubt it, and thus this skepticism folds on itself. As such, 
consciousness is the one thing we can be absolutely certain exists.  
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 However, the body seemed to Descartes to be of a different constitution than the thinking 
mind, a sort of “machine so built up and composed of nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin” 
(1641/2016, p. 113, my emphasis). Since the mind did not seem like a machine, he concluded 
that it had to be separate from the body and that it could exist independently of the body 
(1641/2016, p. 109). Chopping off a body part seemed to have no implication on the mind, and a 
mental state was always unified and indivisible, so Descartes reasoned that while the body is 
extended in space and is divisible in parts, the mind is unextended in space and is indivisible 
(1641/2016, p. 114). In sum, Descartes established his idea of himself as follows: “I have a clear 
and distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the 
other, I possess a distinct idea of body, inasmuch as it is only an extended and unthinking thing” 
(1641/2016, p. 113). Descartes as such separated the mind and the body as two fundamentally 
different entities and gave rise to a metaphysical dualism, where the mind consists of a non-
physical substance and the body of a physical one. Cartesian dualism was born.  
Currently, Cartesian dualism is commonly held, although by no means exclusively, by 
religious thinkers. In religious thought the soul, self, or other conceivable essence of human 
beings, is usually regarded as being separate from the physical realm of nature and of bodies. 
Furthermore, Cartesian dualism is likely the most natural view for people to hold as well, based 
on primary intuitions. It certainly seems as though our very being, and mode of experiencing, is 
distinct from the inanimate physical stuff around us. It seems as though we are living inside of 
our bodies, rather than just being our bodies. Despite these points in its favor, as we shall see, 
there are some serious problems with Cartesian dualism.  
Objections to Cartesian Dualism 
 While there are plenty of objections to Cartesian dualism, in this section I will only cover 
the ones I believe to be the strongest and most fundamental. These are: (1) The Problem of the 
Strange Nature of the Mental, (2) The Problem of Other Minds, and (3) The Mind-Body 
Interaction Problem.  
All of the problems can be introduced by articulating the views of the philosopher Gilbert 
Ryle. In his book The Concept of Mind, Ryle dubs the Cartesian view as “the dogma of the Ghost 
in the Machine” (1949/2009, p. 5). This idea refers to how Descartes gave the mind mysterious 
and immaterial qualities, much like a ghost, and left it “in charge” of the mechanistic body (Ryle 
1949/2009, p. 8-9). Ryle accuses Descartes’ idea of being a myth originating from making a 
serious category-mistake (1949/2009, p. 6). An example of a category-mistake is explained by 
Ryle as follows: “A foreigner visiting Oxford … for the first time is shown a number of colleges, 
libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then 
asks ‘But where is the University?’” (1949/2009, p. 6). This foreigner made a category-mistake 
by assuming that ‘the University’ belonged to the same category as the buildings and offices 
which he visited, whereas in fact ‘the University’ is constituted by those very buildings and 
offices (Ryle 1949/2009, p. 6-7). In the same manner, Descartes made a mistake by categorizing 
the mind as a feature distinct from the features of emotions, sensations, thoughts, and behavior. 
As stated, Descartes held that there was something, namely the mind, that was engaged in the 
thinking. It is, on Ryle’s view, a mistake to invoke an extra substance to constitute the mind, 
these aforementioned mental states and dispositions are the mind, just like the institutions and 
offices are the university (Ryle 1949/2009, p. 6-9). As such, the first objection to Cartesian 
dualism is articulated: it is of a strange nature, and unnecessarily invoked, much like a ghost. 
Because Descartes’ conception of mind is non-physical, another reason why many scientists and 
philosophers refuse to accept it is because science involves empirical research of the physical 
2  Tommy Tobias Aahlberg 
 
world, and as such we could never hope to find evidence for the non-physical Cartesian mind 
through the, mostly well-regarded, operations of the physical sciences.  
From the first objection the second follows in close quarters. It turns to criticize Cartesian 
dualism for failing to give an adequate account for the existence of minds other than one’s own. 
As stated, Descartes himself granted that the only thing we could be sure of was that we 
ourselves, as subjects, exist in our own right as thinking things (1641/2016, p. 76). This notion 
cannot be extended to certify the existence of a mind in another person as we do not have direct 
access to this person’s consciousness. In the words of Ryle, “direct access to the workings of a 
mind is the privilege of that mind itself; in default of such privileged access, the workings of one 
mind are inevitably occult to everyone else” (1949/2009, p. 4). If we cannot express any 
certainty in, or find evidence for, the existence of other minds, this is clearly a problem for 
Cartesian dualism, as we would naturally want to be able to justify the existence of minds other 
than our own.  
The third and final objection is perhaps the most common one that a metaphysical dualist 
of any type will encounter, and that is the problem of how something non-physical could 
possibly have causal relations with something physical. By definition, physical and non-physical 
stuff are made of different metaphysical substances, operating on different planes of existence. 
Yet it is fairly obvious that the mind and the body must somehow interact with one another. On 
Descartes’ view, as articulated by Ryle, “Human bodies are in space and are subject to the 
mechanical laws which govern all other bodies in space … But minds are not in space, nor are 
their operations subject to mechanical laws” (1949/2009, p. 1-2). Consequently, Ryle continues, 
“Theorists are found speculating how stimuli, the physical sources of which are yards or miles 
outside a person’s skin, can generate mental responses inside his skull, or how decisions framed 
inside his cranium can set going movements of his extremities” (1949/2009, p. 1-2). Descartes 
himself hypothesized that the mind was outputting signals to the physical pineal gland of the 
brain through “pulling levers” located in the gland (Robinson 2017). However, this description 
does not specify how the problem posed above is solved, there is still a gap in conceivable 
interaction between two ultimately different types of substances. To this day The Mind-Body 
Interaction Problem remains the most prominent objection to Cartesian dualism, and together 
with the two previous objections it is often regarded as rendering it an implausible metaphysical 
theory.  
Physicalism: The Reductive View 
 If one is convinced by the objections to Cartesian dualism formulated above, the most 
common alternative metaphysical position to turn to is physicalism. Contrary to Cartesian 
dualism, physicalism is a monistic metaphysic, meaning that it states that the nature of reality 
consists of only one substance, which on the picture of physicalism is physical. Consequently, 
physicalism has reduced the Cartesian non-physical mind into something purely physical. 
Physicalism is the most prominent view among scientists and analytic philosophers of 
mind today. In part, what physicalism has going for it ties together nicely with the progress of 
the natural sciences; physics, biology, chemistry, and their sub-disciplines have evolved theories 
that are able to coherently explain phenomena of the natural world at an incredible capacity. 
They also show no signs of slowing down, as new data and novel hypotheses are being generated 
continuously, progressing towards ever new technologies and insights. This prominence of 
physicalism is itself often posed as a reason for rejecting Cartesian dualism. Partly given the 
exponentially growing explanatory power of the natural sciences in regards to our mental states 
being nothing but physical brain states, there is no need to introduce the existence of a non-
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physical mind. The Problem of Other Minds would also be less of an issue if we could find a 
physical basis for the mind, because by virtue of being physical it would be spatially localizable 
in other people’s brains (whereas the non-physical could not be). We also eradicate The Mind-
Body Interaction Problem, as physicalism reduces the mental to physical brain processes.  
The physicalist view might not seem as intuitively powerful as Cartesian dualism since 
our conscious experiences seem so different from physical stuff – it is hard to conceive of them 
as phenomena composed of the same stuff as the rest of the physical world. Yet, science and 
exploration time and time again prove our intuitions faulty. We have long ago learned that Earth 
is not flat, that the sun does not revolve around Earth, that we essentially consist of stardust, and 
share genetic material with onions, even though these are all counterintuitive ideas. Still, 
Descartes’ original idea is lodged in the back of our heads, as our intuitions about the nature of 
the mind itself might be considered as different from our intuitions about the external world.  
Objections to Physicalism 
Despite the rather optimistic depiction of physicalism above, the view is not a perfect 
replacement of Cartesian dualism. There are strong philosophical objections that threaten the 
probability of the view as it relates to consciousness. I will here provide two prominent 
objections to the view: (1) The Knowledge Problem, and (2) The Brute Emergence Problem.  
 The first objection, The Knowledge Problem, was articulated by the philosopher Frank 
Jackson in 1982. In his paper “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, he writes: 
Tell me everything physical there is to tell about what is going on in a living brain, the 
kind of states, their functional role, their relation to what goes on at other times and in 
other brains, and so on and so forth, and be I as clever as can be in fitting it all together, 
you won’t have told me about the hurtfulness of pains, the itchiness of itches, pangs of 
jealousy, or about the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, smelling a rose, 
hearing a loud noise or seeing the sky. (Jackson 1982, p. 127) 
Here, Jackson shines light on the issue that physical information by itself cannot give an 
adequate account for explaining phenomenal states, and as such pure physicalism seems to leave 
a fundamentally important aspect of reality out of its description of the world. Since phenomenal 
states are based in consciousness, this is a problem for the physicalist on the question of mind.  
To further illustrate this point, Jackson invites us to picture the hypothetical 
neurophysiologist Mary (1982, p. 130). Mary has never seen color in her whole life, as she has 
been trapped in a black and white room; she has, however, accumulated all the physical 
information possible regarding the processes and facts about the perception of color (Jackson 
1982, p. 130). Now Jackson poses the question, “What will happen when Mary is released from 
her black and white room … Will she learn anything or not?” (1982, p. 130). It seems obvious 
that she will learn what it is like to perceive color. Jackson concludes by saying that 
“Physicalism is false. … the polemic strength of the Knowledge argument is that it is so hard to 
deny the central claim that one can have all the physical information without having all the 
information there is to have” (1982, p. 130). Undoubtedly, if Jackson is correct, we cannot on a 
physicalist worldview explain conscious experience descriptively, and this gives us a good 
reason to consider rejecting it. 
 The second objection, The Brute Emergence Problem, is brought to life as one attempts 
to hold the view that (A) there exists non-experiential stuff (as most physicalists believe) 
together with the view that (B) there exists experience (as most physicalists also believe). This 
objection has been well documented by the philosopher of mind Galen Strawson. In his paper 
“Realistic Monism – Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism” he explains that holding such a 
4  Tommy Tobias Aahlberg 
 
view must invoke a phenomenon of brute – often termed radical – emergence (2006, p. 18). He 
states the idea of the traditional physicalist as follows: “physical stuff in itself, in its basic nature, 
is indeed a wholly non-conscious, non-experiential phenomenon. Nevertheless, when parts of it 
combine in certain ways, experiential phenomena ‘emerge’” (Strawson 2006, p. 12). The 
problem with this idea is of a similar kind to Descartes’ problem of mind-body causation, i.e. the 
problem of how something of a certain (non-experiential) nature could cause something of a 
different (experiential) nature to emerge. 
 Strawson elaborates on this issue by discussing perfectly valid cases of emergence in the 
physical world. In regards to liquidity and water, he writes that, “Liquidity is not a characteristic 
of individual H2O molecules. … Yet when you put many H2O molecules together they constitute 
a liquid (at certain temperatures, at least) … So liquidity is a truly emergent property of certain 
groups of H2O molecules. It is not there at the bottom of things, and then it is there” (2006, p. 
13). By using homogenous concepts of physics, Strawson continues, “We can easily make 
intuitive sense of the idea that certain sorts of molecules are so constituted that they don’t bind 
together in a tight lattice but slide past or off each other (in accordance with van de Waals 
molecular interaction laws) in a way that gives rise to – is – the phenomenon of liquidity” (2006, 
p. 13). It is evident from cases such as liquidity that the emergent phenomenon is wholly 
dependent on what it emerges out of; in the case of the liquidity of water we can say that 
liquidity, the emergent phenomenon, is wholly dependent on the, solitarily non-liquid, H2O 
molecules themselves (Strawson 2006, p. 13-14).  
This is where we run into problems with the view that experience emerges from non-
experiential stuff. To say that experience is wholly dependent on features of non-experiential 
stuff put together in a specific way is, according to Strawson, “[to affirm] a miracle every time it 
occurs, for it is true by hypothesis that in brute emergence there is absolutely nothing about X, 
the emerged-from, in virtue of which Y, the emerger, emerges from it” (2006, p. 18). In other 
words, brute emergence entails emergence of a phenomenon from something that is completely 
unlike that phenomenon, and cannot as such in any conceivable way be wholly dependent on 
what it is supposed to have emerged from. As just explored, liquidity emerging from H2O 
molecules is not brute because it is explicable under certain laws of nature and is dependent on 
the H2O molecules themselves. Analogously to the inconceivability of something unextended 
emerging out of something extended, or something spatial emerging out of something non-
spatial, experience cannot emerge out of non-experience without invoking a miracle (Strawson 
2006, p. 16-17). This problem poses yet another obstacle for traditional physicalism, a view that 
is supposed to be able to reduce Descartes’ miracle of the non-physical mind into a wholly non-
miraculous physical phenomenon.  
Physicalist Panpsychism: The Fused View 
Having now examined the two most prominent metaphysical positions, Cartesian dualism 
and physicalism, and raised their most damaging objections, I will move on to articulate the view 
of panpsychism, which I argue to be the most viable alternative to them. We could say that 
physicalism solves the prominent problems of Cartesian dualism, and I will argue that the type of 
panpsychism I will put forth in turn solves the problems of traditional physicalism. 
Broadly speaking, panpsychism is the view that consciousness or experience is not unique to 
certain types of physical systems, such as brains. Rather, panpsychism regards consciousness as 
being everywhere, a fundamental component of everything. There are quite a few different forms 
of the theory, and in this paper I will specifically argue for a physicalist kind of panpsychism that 
states that consciousness is the intrinsic nature of physical stuff itself. As hinted by its name, this 
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is still a position of monistic physicalism, it simply augments the claims made by traditional 
physicalism by introducing an experiential nature to the physical. This view can be distinguished 
from the panpsychism that, for instance, states that in a top-down manner the cosmos as a whole 
is conscious (cosmopsychism); or the panpsychism that states that consciousness, while existing 
in everything physical, is non-physical rather than physical (property dualistic panpsychism) 
(Goff et al. 2017).  
A physicalist panpsychist holds that since physics and the other sciences tell us about the 
structure and behavior of physical reality, without giving it a specific nature, we are ignorant in 
regards to what the intrinsic nature of reality really is. Therefore, it is not contradictory to hold 
that the intrinsic nature of physical reality might itself be experiential. The view is in this aspect 
similar to a view referred to as Russellian Monism. In the words of the analytic philosopher and 
mathematician Bertrand Russell himself: 
[Our] knowledge of the physical world is purely abstract: we know certain logical 
characteristics of its structure, but nothing of its intrinsic character. There is nothing in 
physics to prove that the intrinsic character of the physical world differs, in this or that 
respect, from that of the mental world, thus from both ends, both by the analysis of 
physics and by the analysis of psychology, we find that mental and physical events form 
one causal whole, which is not known to consist of two different sorts. …  We know the 
intrinsic character of the mental world to some extent, but we know absolutely nothing of  
the intrinsic character of the physical world. (Russell 1927, p. 306-307) 
In the footsteps of Russell, Galen Strawson argues, echoing Descartes, that since we know that 
experience exists by virtue of experiencing, the real question is whether something non-
experiential exists (2006, p. 4). The reason I spent quite some time articulating Strawson’s 
critique of brute emergence in the above section on traditional physicalism was not coincidental, 
but rather because the issue transitions naturally into the view of panpsychism. Strawson argues 
that the massive problem of trying to provide an explanation of the relationship between 
experience and non-experiential phenomena (i.e. solving the brute emergence problem), as 
traditional physicalists and scientists engage in, is born out of the unjustified assumption that 
there must exist something wholly non-experiential (2006, p. 20). Strawson suspects that a large 
portion of this move originates from the belief that physics can tell us all there is to know about 
the universe (2013/2018, p. 158). This, as already articulated, is a mistake as “Physics may tell 
us a lot about the structure of physical reality, but it doesn’t and can’t tell us anything about the 
intrinsic nature of reality insofar as its intrinsic nature is more than its structure. On this matter 
physics is perfectly silent” (Strawson 2013/2018, p. 158). In fact, the only direct knowledge of 
something intrinsic we have is our own subjective experience. Since on a physicalist picture this 
experience must be physical, and at the same time we really have no evidence that there is the 
phenomena of non-experience, it is perfectly tenable to argue that physicalist panpsychism – the 
view that everything physical is intrinsically experiential – is true.  
Upon contemplation, we find that the burden of proof weighs on the person trying to 
justify the existence of non-experience, “for which there is absolutely no evidence whatever”, as 
opposed to the person arguing that experience, “the phenomenon whose existence is more certain 
than the existence of anything else”, is fundamental to reality (Strawson 2006, p. 20; p. 1). This 
point was also facilitated by the astrophysicist Arthur Eddington in 1928. In a similar manner as 
Russell, in his book, The Nature of the Physical World, Eddington writes: 
[Science] has nothing to say as to the intrinsic nature of the atom. The physical atom is, 
like everything else in physics, a schedule of pointer readings. The schedule is, we agree, 
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attached to some unknown background. Why not then attach it to something of spiritual 
nature of which a prominent characteristic is thought. It seems rather silly to prefer to 
attach it to something of a so-called “concrete” nature inconsistent with thought, and then 
to wonder where thought comes from. (Eddington 1928, p. 259) 
As implicitly illustrated by Russell, Eddington, and Strawson, one positive attribute of 
physicalist panpsychism is that it seems to follow Occam’s razor, i.e. that it is the most 
parsimonious and simple explanation of how consciousness might exist in a purely physical 
world. Again, there is no good reason to rapidly leap to the conclusion that everything else is 
non-experiential when we know that there is experience in ourselves. 
 Furthermore, in the case of Mary and The Knowledge Problem posed in my discussion of 
physicalism, we might be able to better explain her lack of knowledge by using panpsychism. If 
we grant that the intrinsic nature of the physical is itself experiential, it follows that unless Mary 
experiences something, she does not have the complete physical information regarding it. We 
can recall that in traditional physicalism, experience is supposed to arise out of processes that can 
be perfectly understood theoretically through the natural sciences. In the case of physicalist 
panpsychism, part of what is to be understood is experience itself for a complete picture of 
reality. The only way we could have the information of seeing color is to experience seeing 
color. An intrinsic nature of something cannot be fully understood unless it is embodied. This 
also turns out to be a general problem with panpsychism as it relates to the empirical nature of 
scientific knowledge, but in the case of The Knowledge Problem articulated by Jackson, it 
provides an adequate solution.  
 It is important to note, at this point, that physicalist panpsychism does not necessarily 
claim that rocks, buildings, or plants, are conscious – at least not in the same way we humans 
are. It is rather conceivable that consciousness operates in degrees, where a single atom may be 
minimally conscious by itself, whereas a complicated brain gives rise to the rich experience of 
human subjectivity. Strawson himself believes that “experience is ‘really just neurons firing’, at 
least in the case of biological organisms like ourselves,” it is simply that, “there is a lot more to 
neurons than physics and neurophysiology record (or can record)” (2006, p. 7).  
If we think of a more primitive physical system or particle (such as a plant or an atom), 
we find that, unlike some animals, there is no complicated brain or nervous structure to support 
and augment its consciousness. If we try to picture being conscious without these systems and 
structures in place, what would it look like? It is inconceivable for a human to picture this of 
course, but we should grant that it would undoubtedly be a very primitive and minimal form of 
consciousness. Perhaps it is not like much at all to be an atom, and still rather minimal of an 
experience to be a plant. Giulio Tononi and Christof Koch, in their paper “Consciousness: Here, 
There, and Everywhere?”, draw a helpful hypothetical analogy between primitive forms of 
consciousness and the idea that at -272.15°C there is still 1°C of heat present – absolute zero is -   
273.15°C or 0 Kelvin (Tononi and Koch 2015, p. 11-13). The presence of the degree is there, 
even though to a human this degree is non-noticeable and incomparable to what we commonly 
consider ‘heat’ to be. Regardless, just like there is 1°C of heat present in this case rather than the 
temperature being absolute zero (i.e. -273.15°C), the important distinction with consciousness in 
lieu of panpsychism is that there is at least a minimal experience, rather than no experience at all, 
that is intrinsic to the atom’s and the plant’s natures. A further analogy of a light bulb might be 
helpful here, where the degree of illumination would represent the degree of consciousness. 
Human experience would represent an intensely bright luminosity whereas that of an atom would 
be so dim it could barely be perceived at all (the plant would be somewhere in between). Again, 
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the important distinction is that there is some illumination fundamentally, as opposed to the light 
bulb being switched off altogether. 
For several of the reasons I have outlined in this section, Strawson makes the bold claim 
that anyone who is a real physicalist should embrace panpsychism, because any other type of 
physicalism fails to take proper account of experience, the one thing we can be certain exists 
(2006, p. 3). I’m inclined to share this insight that since the only real certainty is experience, it 
makes more sense to attribute experience as a fundamental characteristic of physical stuff itself, 
as opposed to trying to puzzle it together with certain vastly distinct non-experiential pieces. 
Rather than giving in to Descartes’ ghost in the machine, or eliminating the ghost leaving only 
the machine, why not give the machine itself a ghost-like nature? There are a few reasons why 
one might be hesitant to make this move, which I will explore next.  
Objections to Physicalist Panpsychism and My Responses to Them 
 There are three major objections to panpsychism that I will cover in the following 
section: (1) The Intuition Argument, (2) The Combination Problem, and (3) the empirically non-
verifiable nature of panpsychism. As they are raised I will subsequently respond to them with 
what I believe to be their strongest refutations. 
The first, and likely most easily contrived, objection to physicalist panpsychism is that 
seeing reality as fundamentally experiential is deeply counterintuitive and is therefore likely not 
true. While some philosophers might value intuitions above other epistemic means I believe that 
this objection ultimately fails. Just as I have argued that the intuitive power of Cartesian dualism 
does not strengthen the theory that we are ghosts inside machines, as Ryle put it, I do not think 
that the lack of intuitive power can alone weaken a theory either. As I have discussed, we often 
err by using our common-sense intuitions, and as such we cannot use them to prove or disprove 
philosophical arguments. At least not when we have alternative means that corroborate these 
arguments – such as parsimony and the certainty of consciousness on panpsychism. Furthermore, 
as I have argued, it is important to keep in mind that having an experiential quality without any 
type of system to support and augment it – such as a brain or a nervous system – as an atom 
might, would be so fundamentally different from the experiential qualities of things with such 
systems – such as human beings – that they would be incomparable. I find it likely that many 
that take The Intuition Argument seriously anthropomorphize the atom by conceiving of it as 
having feelings, sensations, and thoughts. I will reiterate: a physicalist panpsychist is not wedded 
to this doctrine.  
The second, and often regarded as most powerful, objection to panpsychism holds that 
there is a problem with combining micro-experiential entities (such as neurons) to give rise to 
macro-experiences (such as human consciousness). This has been known as The Combination 
Problem. It was articulated by William James, in his work Principles of Psychology, with the 
following analogy: “Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one 
word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as 
intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence” (James 1890, p. 
343-344). In his book Panpsychism in the West, David Skrbina poses the problem accordingly: 
“If each particle of matter is individually intelligent, how do they combine to form the single 
sense of being that we all feel?” (2005, p. 108). Here we risk running into another problem of 
emergence. Although it is important to note that the emergence would not be brute as in the case 
of experience emerging from non-experiential stuff. Rather, we have a macro-experience 
emerging out of micro-experiences. While the potential mechanisms and phenomena that could 
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be involved are unknown, explaining this macro-experiential emergence is by its very nature less 
hopeless than explaining a case of brute emergence.  
Unfortunately, we cannot escape the combination problem this easily. If macro-
experientiality is a truly emergent phenomenon of micro-experiences, one further implication is 
that it is not contradictory on the panpsychist view to state that inside of us right now, every 
single atom, neuron, nerve bundle, module, and the brain in its entirety, are all conscious at the 
same time. This would mean that there are many lower forms of consciousness operating in me 
as a person right now, some of which (the more complicated systems within my brain and 
perhaps my gut) would conceivably have their own thoughts, feelings, sensations, volitions, and 
intentions. Philip Goff, in his paper “Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help Us Explain 
Consciousness”, invites us to picture a “micro-experiential zombie” (2009, p. 296). Goff argues 
that, on the view of panpsychism, it is perfectly plausible to conceive of a creature identical to 
human beings, but which nevertheless has no overarching human consciousness but is simply 
conscious in its micro-parts (2009, p. 296). In order to get around this problem there has to be an 
account for how micro-experiences could give rise to a macro-experience that replaces the 
micro-experiences. In other words, the combination problem needs to be properly solved.  
The contemporary philosopher Hedda Hassel Mørch articulates an interesting response to 
the combination problem in her dissertation, Panpsychism and Causation: A New Argument and 
a Solution to the Combination Problem. She argues that one way to get around the problem is to 
embrace the idea that as systems integrate, the more advanced or integrated system is conscious 
while the consciousness of its smaller parts dissipates (Mørch 2014, p. 169). They fuse together 
as a larger singular whole and as such the view has been dubbed the fusion view (Goff et al. 
2017). In order to make her case Mørch cites one of the philosopher Derek Parfit’s famous 
thought experiments in which a brain has been severed in half and each hemisphere is 
psychologically recording information independently of the other. As the two hemispheres are 
put back together their two vastly distinct experiences fuse together to form one unified 
experience (Mørch 2014, p. 169-170). In a similar vein, Mørch argues that distinct micro-
experiences could plausibly fuse into a unified experience, she writes: 
Combination of microsubjects could be analogous to this scenario of unification of 
hemispheres, where two streams of experiences fuse. In a simple case of combination, we 
would have two microexperiences in separate streams constituting individual 
microsubjects. Combination happens when two experiences at some point jointly cause a 
single new experience that is equally similar and equally strongly causally connected to 
both of them, so that they both count as “surviving” as it. (Mørch 2014, p. 170) 
Mørch continues by detailing the potential qualities of a fused experience as follows: 
The new experience will, in some sense, have to be twice as rich and complex as the two 
previous experiences, having similarities to both of them. Let us say that each of the 
streams consist of experiences that are simple in the sense of having one quality. One is 
the experience of, say, pure red and the other is the experience of pure blue. The 
experience they jointly cause would be an experience of red fading into blue with some 
purple in between. (Mørch 2014, p. 170) 
Mørch’s view is definitely interesting and would seem to get around the combination problem. 
While currently being a purely philosophical thesis, I find it more plausible and coherent than 
invoking brute emergence in ordinary physicalism, or arguing in a Cartesian fashion that 
something non-physical can share a causal relationship with the physical. 
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The third and final objection to physicalist panpsychism that I will mention draws its 
firepower from the empirical nature of science. In short, it conveys that if we can never hope to 
empirically gain insight into the nature of the physical, we will never be able to scientifically 
verify that panpsychism is true. Regardless of whether a scientific theory could accurately 
measure the level of consciousness in a system based on its integration or complexity, we would 
yet remain ignorant as to whether or not the intrinsic nature of the systems that are said to be 
experiencing is itself truly experiential. This argument can be likened to the idea that we cannot 
be sure of whether or not anyone other than ourselves is really conscious, as we cannot enter into 
someone else’s brain to phenomenally perceive if, and if so what, they are perceiving (The 
Problem of Other Minds). Yet we commonly regard this epistemic gap as insignificant enough to 
resist the impulse to doubt the existence of other minds. I argued that a physical basis for minds 
strengthens their existence, and physicalist panpsychism does not divert from the path of 
traditional physicalism in this respect. I argue that we can extend this epistemic generosity to 
include that of physical systems other than our own brains, that after all are composed of the 
same stuff simply organized in different ways, since, even without panpsychism, we have 
reasons to believe that humans are not uniquely conscious. To finish this point, and section as a 
whole, it is worth mentioning that the claim that the fundamental nature of the physical world is 
non-experiential could not, following the same objection, be scientifically verified either. In this 
case then, science cannot overrule our commonsense intuitions in either direction, at which point 
I think we should adhere to Occam’s razor and accept physicalist panpsychism over competing 
metaphysical theories on the question of consciousness and its grounding in reality. 
Conclusion 
 I have in this paper only scratched the surface of physicalist panpsychism and its 
possibilities. As we have seen, there are some clear problems with the view as well. One of 
which, the problem of empirical insight into the intrinsic nature of reality, might stay with us 
forever. Regardless, Cartesian dualism and ordinary physicalism have their problems as well. I 
have argued, following Galen Strawson and others, that physicalist panpsychism yields the better 
and more parsimonious explanation out of the three when it comes to unravelling the mysterious 
origins of conscious experience.  
Physicalist panpsychism resists The Mind-Body Interaction Problem of Cartesian 
dualism by being a monistic view while also getting around its strangeness – some would argue 
at the cost of embracing another type of strangeness – and it is better suited to explain the 
presence of other minds than Descartes’ view since it is a physicalist theory. Furthermore, it 
helps us amend The Knowledge Problem that ordinary physicalism struggles with because by 
virtue of the physical being intrinsically experiential, the complete physical information of a 
phenomenal experience is not attained unless this intrinsicness is experienced. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, it handles one of the hardest problem of all, the Problem of Brute 
Emergence, by turning all conceivable non-experiential stuff into experiential stuff, leaving no 
room for miracles. Despite these virtues, as we have seen it also carries its own problems, the 
largest of which is The Combination Problem. In response I have argued that Hedda Hassel 
Mørch’s fusion view is a promising potential solution to this problem. In the end, unravelling the 
elusive origins of consciousness may prove an unsurpassable obstacle for human knowledge. 
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